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Ford: The Impact of Judicial Review on the Federal Communications Commi

The Impact of Judicial Review
on the Federal Communications Commission *
FREDRICK W. FoRD**

In recent years the administrative process, particularly as
reflected in the workings of the major federal independent regulatory
agencies, has been the subject of searching reappraisals in many
quarters. The House of Representatives has established a Special
Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight to inquire into the manner
in which the principal regulatory agencies have been executing their
statutory mandates. Senate and House committees have been considering legislation which if enacted would bring about large scale
revisions in procedure. The Judicial Conference of the United States
has recommended the formation of a Conference on Administrative
Procedure to give closer study on a continuing basis to the administrative process. And some legal scholars and political scientists
have called for a substantial overhaul of the entire system. The
administrative process has periodically been subjected to such scrutiny and has benefited by it. Over the long run, however, the most
permanent and effective source of control has, I think, been provided
by those courts whose functions have included the review of agency
actions.
Broadly speaking, judicial review is limited, in theory at least,
to confining agency actions within the delegated statutory authority
and to providing a check against arbitrary and capricious action.
Its effectiveness has occasionally been criticized because of these
limitations and others imposed by requirements of a jurisdictional
nature, such as standing, ripeness for review and so forth. Nevertheless as the Chairman of a major federal regulatory agency I can
assure you that the courts exercise a meaningful and continuous
influence on our deliberations. I would like today to give you, in
necessarily sketchy terms, but with reference to a number of specific
instances, some idea of the review which the courts exercise over
our agency, the Federal Communications Commission. I became
a member of the Commission in 1957 and most of the cases I
• This paper was originally delivered before the West Virginia Bar

Association annual meeting at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, September 2, 1960.
•* Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.
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mention have been handed down either since that time or sufficiently
close to that date for me to experience their impact on our processes.
I should perhaps point out at the outset that the Commission's
area of interest from a regulatory standpoint includes broadcasting,
common carriers engaged in interstate and foreign communication
by wire or radio, and the many safety and special radio services
(marine, industrial, aviation, amateurs and so forth). The greatest
number of our actions which become the subject of judicial review,
however, concern either licensing or rule making in the broadcast
field, and my remarks will be directed to these matters.
The basic delegation of authority which the Communications
Act bestows on us is the rather broad mandate to act in "the public
interest, convenience and necessity."' One writer has described
such a statutory standard as saying, in effect: "Here is the problem.
Deal with it."' It is really not that broad a delegation, however, since
we are required to consider matters of "citizenship, character, and
financial, technical and other qualifications";' we may not grant
the application of an alien, a foreign corporation or foreign government;4 we are directed to make "a fair, efficient and equitable
distribution of radio service" among the various states and communities of the nation;' and international agreements limit the use
we can make of certain radio frequencies.
From a functional standpoint the Commission's major responsibilities in the realm of licensing fall into four categories: the renewal
of broadcast licenses transfers in the ownership or control of broadcast
stations; the construction and operation of new radio and television
stations, and major modifications in these stations, such as increases
in power and antenna heights, change in station locations, etc.
We have broad rule making powers as well. Section 4(i) of
the Communications Act empowers the Commission to "make such
rules and regulations . . . not inconsistent with this Act as may
be necessary in the executions of its functions," 6 and Section 303 7
'48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§303, 307, 309, 310, 316 (1952).

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
2 1 DAvIs, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW 87 (1958).
348 Stat. 1084 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1952).
448 Stat. 1086 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 210(a) (1952).
548 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1952).
648 Stat. 1066 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1952).
748 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
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enumerates a wide variety of situations over which we are authorized to exercise jurisdiction.
Under Section 402 of the Communications Act' review of
a Commission decision or order may be sought by any person
"who is aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" thereby.
This section, incorporated into the Act in 1952, reflected significant
changes in the review provisions which had governed the relationship between the Commission and the courts during most of
the agency's lifetime. Subsection (a) provides that, with certain
exceptions (set forth in subsection (b)), proceedings to enjoin,
set aside, amend or suspend orders of the Commission are to be
brought under the Judicial Review Act of 1950. This Act did
away with the provision that three-judge district courts review
Commission actions and substituted review by the various United
States Courts of Appeals.
Subsection (b) of Section 402 provides that actions seeking
review of decisions and orders involving the exercise of our radio
licensing functions must be brought in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The remaining subsections set forth the procedures governing 402(b) appeals and
prescribe the nature and extent of appellate jurisdiction. For example, the court may grant motions for stay (402(c)); the scope
of review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act is made
applicable (402(g)); and upon a reversal of its decision, the Commission, in giving effect to the court's judgment, must do so on the
existing record unless otherwise ordered (402 (h)). This latter provision overrules an earlier Supreme Court decision that had sustained
the Commission's power to give consideration on remand to circumstances occurrring subsequent to the original proceeding.9
The impact of judicial review on the functions I enumerated
above has varied. With respect to transfers of ownership and
renewals, Commission action has almost invariably resulted in
grants of the applications in question so that the occasion for appellate review has been minimal. The cases which have arisen have
usually concerned, the rights of third persons to protect the grants
and have them designated for evidentiary hearing. The readiness
of the court to find that standing exists and to require a hearing
66 Stat. 718 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1952).
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).

8
9
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where on the basis of the pleadings the Commission has found no
substantial unresolved public interest question, has been the most
striking feature of review in this area. For example, in the Camden
Radio case,"0 an existing licensee was held a person "aggrieved,"
with standing to protest the transfer of an outstanding authorization
even though no injury arising from the transfer was shown. Its
status as a prospective competitor of the assignee was deemed sufficient. In another case a business concern competing with RCA
in the manufacture and sale of appliances and electronic equipment was deemed to have standing to protest renewal of the license
of a station owned by the National Broadcasting Company, an
RCA subsidiary. In the court's judgment the operation of the station
by NBC secured competitive advertising advantages for RCA sufficient to confer standing on a competitor as a person aggrieved by
renewal of the license."
2 the court 'held
In Federal Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC"
that the statutory language requiring a protest to "specify with
particularity the facts, matters and things relied on," had been
satisfied "merely" so long as some fact or situation was articulated
which "would tend to show" that a grant was improperly made.
The Commission was accordingly required to hold an evidentiary
hearing on a station's renewal of license although on the basis of
the pleadings before it, it was satisfied that no substantial public
interest question was present. Primarily then, reversal of Commission
action in these areas has rested on a procedural rather than a substantive basis. I can recall no instance since I have been a member
of the Commission where a decision involving as assignment of
license or a renewal has been upset when reviewed on the merits.
Applications for new stations and for major modifications in
existing facilities present more difficult problems. Rights of existing
stations and other applicants are more frequently involved, and the
cases become more complex and hard-fought. In addition to the
standards of character, citizenship, and financial and technical
soundness, these cases often involve questions as to which of several
applicants or frequency assignments will better serve the public
interest. On all of these matters the Commission has considerable
10 Camden Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 220 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
1Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See, Granik
v. FCC, 234 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC,
221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
12 225 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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latitude stemming from its status as an expert body in the field
and from its statutory position as the agency entrusted by the Congress
with the responsibility for regulating the broadcast industry. Yet, a
look at the decisions reviewing our proceedings shows that it has
not been at all uncommon for the court to reverse where the result
reached has seemed to it unsatisficatory.
On the matter of character it has been held that misrepresentation of the Commission can result in disqualification as a licensee."3
However, in a much litigated case involving a television station in
Spartansburg, South Carolina, the Commission determined after a
full evidentiary hearing that there had been no misrepresentation
on the part of a licensee. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that our own standard of what constituted misrepresentation to a
regulatory body had been too mild. On the basis of the same evidence
which had been considered by the Commission, the court found that
"calculated, deliberate" misrepresentation had occurred. Reviewing
the evidence again, the Commission found no "wilfur' intent to
deceive, and again the court remanded the case. Thus we had a
situation in which the regulatory body concerned twice satisfied
itself that data submitted to it did not preclude an applicant from
receiving a grant; however, the court of appeals reversed the Commission in both instances. 4 The case, which began in 1954, is still
before us.
In order to receive a license an applicant, among other things,
must be found to possess certain financial qualifications, and the
court has been generally willing to accept the determiniations of the
Commission in this area." A recent case to the contrary offers,
in my view, a rather striking example of the very broad review
function which a court will on occasion exercise. Normally, under
our procedures, an applicant's financial capabilities are questioned
in a hearing only if a preliminary examination of data submitted
in the application raises a substantial doubt as to his qualification.
In this particular case, a contest between two applicants for a
television channel in Biloxi, Mississippi, no financial question seemed
apparent, and our order setting forth the issues on which the hearing
11 FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
14
Hall v. FCC, 237 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Hall v. FCC, 257 F.2d
626 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
15
E.g. Deep South Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 278 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Columbia Empire Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 228 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
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was to be held, simply referred to the fact that the applicants were
found to have been "legally, technically and financially qualified."
A decision favoring one of the applicants was eventually rendered
and the loser sought review. The validity of the Commission's finding
as to financial qualifications was not, however, raised in the appeal
Nonetheless, in remanding the case the court found that "the Commission plainly erred in holding Radio Associates financially qualified" and the case was remanded. 6 Thus, in a decision which had
rather far-reaching consequences on our internal procedures, the
court was deciding an issue which was never seriously raised before
the Commission and which had been neither briefed nor argued by
any party to the court proceeding.
The task of providing the "fair, equitable and efficient" radio
service called for under Section 307(b) of the Communications Act
encompasses consideration of such matters as existing services, interference between stations, outlets for local self-expression and so
forth. This concept is so fundamental to the task of assigning
broadcast licenses that it is the subject of adjudication in a great
number of FCC proceedings. Aside from the procedural rights
involved the subject matter of these cases is clearly one calling for
the type of "expertise" which the Commission was established to
bring to bear on the licensing of broadcast stations. Generally speaking, this is reflected in the frequency with which the Commission has
been sustained by the Courts when review is sought. By and large
the Commission's determinations as to what constitutes a "community" for allocations purposes, the need for a new service vis-a-vis
a service that would be lost through interference, and the needs of
one community over another for a broadcast service have generally
been upheld. 7 Three somewhat related appeals' court decisions
setting aside Commission actions represent an important exception
in this area and show that even here the courts actively scrutinize
the bases for Commission actions in individual cases. The first of
these, Allentown BroadcastingCo. v. F.C.C.'8 presented the following
question: In choosing between competing applicants who would
provide broadcast stations to different communities, should the
16 MrLO X
7

Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 260 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
' E.g. Jackson Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. FCC, 280 F.2d 676
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Red River Valley Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 562
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 265 F.2d 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1959); Albertson v. FCC, 243 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
18 222 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Commission give primary consideration to the comparative qualifications of the applicants or to the needs of the respective communities for the service proposed? The court of appeals, in reversing
a Commission decision, held in effect that the needs of the different
communities could be considered only after the abilities of the
competing applicants to meet those needs had been found to be equal.
Here, however, the Supreme Court reversed this judgment and upheld
the Commission's contention that a fair, efficient and equitable
distribution of radio service required that paramount consideration
be given to the needs of the communities involved rather than the
qualifications of individual applicants.19
The type of evidence which may be adduced to determine the
need for one service over another, however, has presented a considerable problem and one on which the Commission and the court
have not always seen eye to eye. For example, when a Commission
examiner and later the Commission itself held that evidence as to
the actual programs proposed by an applicant and those which
were already being broadcast over existing stations was irrelevant
to the issue of need for a new service the court remanded the case,
holding that a comparative appraisal as between an existing service
and that which a new replacing signal would provide was what "the
public interest command[s]."'
In a recent case the court found that the Commission's decision
granting an applicant for Plainview, Texas, and denying one for
Slaton, a smaller nearby community, was unsupported by substantial
evidence, even though the record showed that the favored community
was nearly three times the size of the other; that the grant would
provide a first competitive service to the community; that Slaton
was in the metropolitan area of a larger city and received service
from six stations in that city; and that the Slaton proposal would
cause interference to an existing station. The court held that there
was insufficient evidence to assume the needs of the community
were being met by the big city stations, and that evidence of the
programming of those stations was the only way to make this determination. 2'
In recent years perhaps our most significant licensing activity
in the broadcast field has concerned competing applications for
19 FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
'oDemocrat Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
2,Harrell & Ashby v. FCC, 267 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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television channels. When, as was often the case, more than one
applicant sought to use the same channel assignment the Commission was required by law to conduct a full sale evidentiary hearing
to determine which of the competing applicants was the better
qualified. From 1952, when the so-called "freeze" was lifted on
television applications, to the present, nearly sixty final decisions
have been rendered by the Commission in this area. While the
number of Commission decisions represent barely 10% of the total
number of commercial television stations which have gone on the
air since 1952-most of the others being issued without hearing
because only one applicant sought the channel-it nonethless constitutes a substantial portion of the adjudicatory workload of the
Commission during this period because of the tremendous length of
the records, the hearing time consumed, and the many procedural
steps required by statute and relevant court decisions. With so much
at stake on the outcome, our decisions were frequently appealednearly half of them having been judicially reviewed.
The attitude of the courts in reviewing this kind of case was
expressed in the following terms by Judge Prettyman, presently
Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
in a decision involving an appeal by a losing applicant for a channel
in Tampa, Florida:
"The controversy is in an area into which the courts are seldom
justified in intruding. The selection of an awardee from among
several qualified applicants is basically a matter of judgment,
often difficult and delicate, entrusted by the Congress to the
administrative agency. The decisive factors in comparable selections may well vary; sometimes one applicant is superior to
another in one respect, whereas in another case one applicant
may be superior to its rivals in another feature. And it is also
true that the Commission's view of what is best in the public
interest may change from time to time. Commissions themselves
change, underlying philosophies differ, and experience often
dictates changes . . . All such matters are for the Congress

and the executive and their agencies. They are political, in
of that abused term. They are not for the
the high sense
22
judiciary."'
That this approach to the exercise of its review function did
not represent the opinion of all nine members of the court of appeals
is at once apparent from the dissenting statement in the same case.
22 Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007.
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Moreover, the meticulous treatment accorded the issues presented
by other cases of this type 3 makes it apparent that judicial review
was far from perfunctory, notwithstanding the very wide area of
Commission discretion which was acknowledged in the above-quoted
language. Nonetheless, even where the court has seemed to disagree
with the result reached, our decisions have, with few exceptions, been
upheld on matters of substance.
In contrast, where the court was of the view that procedural
error has occurred or that the state of the record before it was not
satisfactory, it has been quick to remand. For example, when it
,appeared to ,the court that an applicant has not "clearly waived"
any objection to having a Commissioner who had not heard oral
argument participate in the decision, the case was remanded for
further proceedings. 24 Another case was remanded because the
Commission had failed to rule with sufficient particularity on exceptions which had been filed by one of the parties.25
In addition, the court has insisted that events occurring after
the closing the record and even after a decision has been rendered
should be taken into consideration if they are substantial in nature.
The death of an important figure in one of the applicants,26 a postdecision change in a grantee's programming and physical plant,27
and issuance of a stock option which if exercised would change the
make-up of a successful applicant' have all been the cause of cases
being remanded for further consideration, even though the events
occurred after the record had been closed and a decision rendered,
and even where the Commission, in the interest of administrative
finality and the expeditious conduct of its affairs, had declined to
exercise its discretion to reopen the proceeding and submit the
applicants to a reappraisal.
Thus far this discussion of the court's review function over the
Commission has been concerned with review exercised within the
framework of Section 402 of the Communications Act. In several
of the cases just mentioned, the events in question occurred while
23

James A. Noe & Co. v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Sacramento
Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 236 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1956); McClatchy Broadcasting
24 Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
WIBC,Inc. v. FCC, 259 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
"Radio Station KFH Co. v. FCC, 247 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
26
Fleming & McNutt v. FCC, 225 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See,
Southland Television Co. v. FCC, 266 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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the Commission retained jurisdiction, even though a final decision
had been rendered, and the court's action reversing the Commission's
refusal to reopen the record rested on what was considered an abuse
of discretion. However, in one of the cases, Fleming v. F.C.C., a
somewhat different situation obtained. Here the death of a partner
in a losing applicant occurred while an appeal was pending but
long after our own proceeding had been terminated. All parties
urged that the appeal be disposed of on the existing record. The
court, however, remanded the case with instructions to weigh the
effect of the death on the earlier decision so that the court would
"have the benefit of [the Commission's] determination before deciding whether to reverse or affirm." The applicable review section of
the Communications Act, unlike some other statutes governing
administrative agencies, confers no authority on the courts to remand
a case except where it has reversed a Commission decision, and
here of course the court did not reverse because it had not reached
the merits. In the absence of specific statutory authority, however,
the court relied on "the general equity powers which a court exercises
in reviewing administrative action." These principles the court
held, "extend to cases where, even without fault of the agency, the
state of the record may preclude a 'just result'."'2 9
Thus, in asserting a broad equity power the court was stating
a basis for appellate review above and beyond the specific terms
of the Communications Act. Subsequently, it was to exercise this
power in a series of cases where the questions involved greatly exceeded in general importance those of the Fleming case. I refer to
those proceedings involving contests for television channels where
an investigation by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Legislative Oversight disclosed that improprieties might have occurred, particularly as to the manner in which certain applicants
sought to influence the outcome by means outside the recognized
processes of adjudication." Here, either at the request of the
Commission,"' or on the court's own motion, 2 or on remand from
2

7 W. S. Butterfield Theatres, Inc. v. FCC, 237 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1956). See, McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
2 The Enterprise Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
29 225 F.2d at 526.
30 See, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958).
31 WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
32 Massachusetts Bay Telecaster's, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
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the Supreme Court,33 the court of appeals remanded a series of
cases for further proceedings on matters which had been brought
to light long after the record was closed and after the cases had
left the Commission; but where it was clear that further deliberation
was required if a just result was to be assured. These actions as
well as some others I have mentioned bear out, I think, the thrust
of Justice Harlan's often quoted observation of many years ago in
his opinion in Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States:
"Suffice it to say, that the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so restrained by technical rules that they could not find
some remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, whether done by
government or by individual persons, that violated natural
justice or were hostile to the fundamental principles devised
for the protection of the essential rights of property."34
Thus far my remarks have been directed to appeals from
Commission decisions in licensing or adjudicatory situations. A
word should perhaps be said about review of our rule making or
quasi-legislative functions, which involve the formulation of regulations governing interstate communications by wire and radio. The
exercise of these functions does not provoke the volume of litigation
that our adjudicatory actions do, but since these petitions for review
frequently challenge the validity of rules affecting an entire industry
their importance is obvious. As I indicated at the outset, pursuant
to section 402(a) of the Communications Act, petitions for review
are governed by the Judicial Review Act of 1950, and the United
States as well as the Commission becomes a party to the proceeding.
The judgments called for in rule making perhaps lie even more
completely in the realm of agency expertise than do those associated
with adjudication. So long as the rule lies within our delegated
authority and a rational basis for its adoption is given, our judgment
has seldom been disturbed. In recent years perhaps the most notable
sequence of broadcast cases demonstrating this had concerned the
allocation of television channels to various communities. The power
of the Commission to adopt a nationwide plan of television channel
assignments by rule rather than by case to case adjudicatory methods
was affirmed in 1953." 5 Since that time a -number of ad hoc changes
33

WORZ, Inc. v. FCC, 268 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

34 216
35

U.S. 177 at 195 (1910).
Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir.
1953). See, Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
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in the basic allocation plan have also been brought about by rule
making and these have been almost universally sustained by the
courts. However, effecting individual changes in an overall assignment plan through rule making rather than through adjudication
has given rise to procedural difficulties which led to the remand of
two cases and has brought about a revision of our own procedures
in cases of this type.
Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act 6 allows for
considerable flexibility in the conduct of rule making proceedings.
Ordinarily there must be notice and opportunity for the expression
of views by interested parties, but even these may be dispensed with
under certain circumstances. Proceedings which have as their objective a change in the channel assignments to individual communities,
although wholly prospective and therefore rule making in nature,
are, nevertheless, more particular than general in their applicability.
In some respects, they might be regarded as having overtones of
licensing because, although no license is ever awarded as a result
of these rule making proceedings, they frequently constitute a preliminary step looking -towards a later modification of an existing
license or making available a new channel the use of which might
be hotly contested. Because of the unusual nature of these proceedings it was argued by some that more than the basic A.P.A. considerations of notice and opportunity to be heard were required.
In WIRL Television Co. v. United States.3" the court rejected
the contention that such a proceeding required an evidentiary-type
record with sworn testimony, cross-examination and so forth. A
similar contention had been rejected in the earlier Logansport case. 8
But when testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight indicated that a participant in a rule
making proceeding involving channels in Springfield, Illinois, and
St. Louis, Missouri, had held off the record discussions on the
merits of the pending proposal with various members of the Commission, the court of appeals vacated our judgment and remanded
the case. Notwithstanding that the case involved a quasi-legislative
rather than a quasi-judicial function of the Commission, the court
held that the essential character of the proceeding included the "reso60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1952).
253 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
36
37

38
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lution of conflicting private claims to a valuable pirvilege" and that
"basic fairness" precluded any discussion of the matter on an
ex parte basis.3 9
Largely as a result of this case the Commission has taken steps
to alter its procedures in a manner which would continue to allow
the free and unfettered communication of ideas characteristic of
the legislative process where rules of general applicability are concerned, but which would require in appropriate rule making cases
that comments directed to a given proposal be made on the record.
I began these remarks today by indicating that the judiciary
constituted an influential and potent force in the operation of an
administrative agency. While I have attempted to suggest some of
the wide variety of situations in which the courts may upset an
agency's determinations, I think that an appreciation of the effect
of these decisions can be gained only when it is realized that they are
not isolated rulings in individual cases but that they become the law,
having the same force as our enabling statute itself. When the court
held in ,the Federalcase40 that allegations which the Commission had
found ,too general were adequate to meet the statutory standard, this
meant not only that Federalforced a business competitor's application
to go through a hearing, but that subsequently many other hearings
on other applications were required on the basis of allegations that
would otherwise have been rejected by the Commission as insufficient to raise any substantial public interest question. Similarly,
when -itwas 'held in the Camden Radio case" that an existing station
had standing as "a person aggrieved" to protest the assignment of
an outstanding permit without showing that any injury would flow
from the assignment, it meant that subsequent transfer applications
could be protested and subjected to delay by parties with no direct
or substantial interest therein. As a result of the Biloxi case42 our
internal screening process covering the financial qualification of
applicants was comprehensively revamped. The court's decision in
39
Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221
(D.C. Cir. 1959). Subsequently, and on remand from the Supreme Court,
the WIRL case, note 37 supra, was also remanded, though apparently only
because that from a geographic and engineering standpoint its outcome could
be considered related to Sangamon.
40Federal Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir.

1955).

Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 220 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
WLOX Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 260 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

41 Camden
42
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the KFH case 3 resulted in a completely revised format and more
painstaking draftsmanship in every Commission decision handed
down since that time. The Slaton-Plainview decision"' made necessary a new look at the type of evidence which would be allowed in
other proceedings involving standard broadcast applications. These
are just a few examples of the far-reaching effects which have flown
from some decisions which I have cited here today. Thus, even
though the number of Commission cases appealed is not great from
a relative standpoint, the influence of the court is nonetheless a pervasive one.
Each year we submit an annual report to the Congress which,
among other things, contains a statistical tabulation of the cases
which have been affirmed or reversed during the previous fiscal year.
In 1957 the Commission was affirmed in twelve cases and reversed
in thirteen. The 1958 and 1959 totals were identical; we were
affirmed in twenty-one cases and reversed in twelve. For the fiscal
year which ended June 30, 1960, our record is sixteen affirmances
with but a single reversal. Attaching much significance to so
limited a sampling is in all likelihood rather rash and unwarranted.
It may be overly optimistic, but I would like to attribute our recent
score of successes in some measure to the development of a greater
mutual understanding between the Commission and the courts.
Whether there should be judicial review of agency action is
hardly an open question at this time. There is in fact much to be
said for Professor Jaffe's proposition that the availability of review
by an independent judiciary, offering as it does a guarantee of legality,
"is the very condition which makes possible, which makes so acceptable, the wide freedom of the administrative system, and give it its
remarkable vitality and flexibility." 45 At the same time, if the administrative system is to continue as an effective instrument for the
regulation of so many facets of our society, there must, I believe,
be a greater appreciation of Justice Frankfurter's view that procedures familiar to the courts for the protection of private rights are
not the only permissible ones and that it is "essential to the vitality
of the administrative process that the procedural powers given to
these agencies not be confined within the conventional modes by
4"
Radio Station KFH v. FCC, 247 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
44
iHarrell & Ashby v. FCC, 267 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
45 Jaffee, The Right to JudicialReview, 71 HARv. L. REV. 401, 406 (1958).
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which business is done in courts."4 6 And finally, I think there must
be meaningful recognition of the concept enunciated by the Supreme
Court in the WOKO case -and others that in ascertaining where lies
the public interest "it is the Commission, not the Courts, which must
be satisfied . . ."I'

46FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239, 248 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
47
FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946).

vile Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
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